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Abstract: Building on an exemplary analysis of self-tracking applications, this paper develops 
a materialist approach to the methodology of apparatus analysis. It builds on the Foucauldian 
concept of the apparatus, which it then subdivides into a micro apparatus, as a concrete digital 
technology, and a macro apparatus, as the superordinate regime to which the micro apparatus 
contributes. To bridge these two concepts, the term “urgent need” is used to ask to which 
broader social problems a given apparatus reacts. Contrary to the approaches of “new mate-
rialism”, this paper insists on an analytical divide between discourse and matter on the one 
hand and action structure on the other hand, in order to consider politico-economic power 
relations. Using this methodology, the relationship between the techno-practice of self-tracking 
and a broader cybernetic regime is illustrated. 
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1. Introduction 
Technologies of digital self-evaluation in their distinctive forms, from self-tracking to 
social media, are enjoying steady popularity. Self-portrayal on different platforms, in 
combination with the continuous feedback of particular communities, allows for a new 
form of reflective self-adaptation and reassurance. In particular, the practice of self-
tracking, i.e. intentional self-quantification by means of digital technologies, is a prime 
example of digital self-evaluation. However, there are two aspects of the term self-
evaluation which go beyond self-tracking. First, the term is open to different kinds of 
technologies, of which self-tracking applications are only one particularly characteristic 
example. Second, it already entails an interpretation: the relevant technologies are not 
only about tracking, but are also always about valuation, which assumes a fundamental 
will to self-optimise on the part of the users. However, the paradigm of evaluation has 
not only developed with the digital technologies researched in this publication. Michael 
Power (1997) spoke of an “audit society” in the context of completely different technol-
ogies in the 1990s, a diagnosis on which I will elaborate further.  
For the critical social science research of digital self-evaluation, one question is 
raised first and foremost: why do people self-evaluate? Why do they track and measure 
their steps, their meals, their sex lives, and publish self-portraits, which are then dis-
cussed and reviewed? In mass media reports about selfies, self-tracking, and so on, 
this question is mostly answered pejoratively as a proliferating narcissistic obsession 
(cf. Weintraub 2013). The disconcert manifesting in this answer is understandable to 
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an extent, but does not contribute to the understanding of self-evaluation practices. 
Instead, in social sciences literature the aspect of self-optimisation is moved to the 
foreground. This analysis is certainly accurate but it explains the how of self-evaluation 
rather than the why. It is therefore time for an evaluation of the evaluation of self-eval-
uation. 
The basic hypothesis of this paper is that the lack of explanatory power of many 
evaluations of self-evaluation in the social sciences goes back to conceptual and meth-
odological origins. Research that only focuses on the interaction of users with certain 
media technologies inevitably loses sight of the politico-economic context through its 
conceptual individualism. However, as this context can lead to important explanatory 
approaches, I plead for an approach that focuses on overarching power structures 
apart from the interaction between users and technologies.  
For such an approach, Michel Foucault’s term of the apparatus offers a good starting 
point for a critical analysis of digital technologies for two reasons. First, it takes seri-
ously the discursive as well as the material aspects of digital technologies. Second, it 
enables a conceptual coupling of both a micro and a macro analysis of the power 
structures in which the object of research is embedded. Following critical-realist dis-
course analysis (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2004; Fairclough 2005; Flatschart 
2015), a materialist apparatus analysis is outlined as a methodological proposition for 
the critical analysis of digital self-evaluation. This approach is a materialist one in two 
senses. On the one hand, it assumes an analytical divide between the discursive and 
the material. According to this approach, when analysing the use of digital technolo-
gies, materiality has to be acknowledged as an independent category with regards to 
its social effects. On the other hand, it assumes that for a critical analysis of modern 
media constellations, the politico-economic context must not be disregarded.  
According to Gilles Deleuze (1997, 184), two different research strategies can be 
carved out of Foucault’s writings concerning apparatus. The first and more broadly 
received variant can be described as a macro apparatus. It understands the apparatus 
as an abstract regime inherent to the social field as a whole, such as the apparatuses 
of confinement or confession. The second variant, an approach appearing especially 
in the context of Foucault’s “microphysics of power”, is described as “diffuse and het-
erogenous multiplicity, ‘micro-dispositifs’.” (Ibid.). This concept of micro-dispositifs or 
micro apparatuses can help to grasp concrete entanglements of discourse and mate-
riality, such as specific technologies. As stated above, for a materialist apparatus anal-
ysis both levels are relevant and should be taken into account.  
Based on this concept, I will sketch a materialist apparatus analysis in three steps 
using the example of self-tracking. In the first step, self-tracking will be described as 
an example of the micro apparatus of digital self-evaluation in its material and discur-
sive functionality. In the second step, I will interpret this micro apparatus with recourse 
to the term social “urgent need” (Foucault 1980, 195). This term links micro and macro 
apparatuses as it asks to which social problems a given micro apparatus reacts. Self-
tracking can therefore be interpreted as a reaction to an “urgent need” for control in a 
post-Fordist economy. In the third step, I will suggest the term “cybernetic regime” to 
indicate a possible superordinate macro apparatus. Finally, I will evaluate my evalua-
tion (of the evaluation) of self-evaluation and wonder if it is ever possible to exit the 
feedback loop.  
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2. The Digital Micro Apparatus: Self-Tracking 
In the following section, I will operationalise the term micro apparatus for an analysis 
of concrete digital technologies. Eugster (2013) and Lepa et al. (2014) undertook use-
ful operationalisations of the term (micro) apparatus for the sociology of media and 
technology. However, to be applied to the analysis of digital technologies, this term 
needs further elaboration and refinement. Technologies of digital self-evaluation are 
concrete material-discursive artefacts within a specific historical and technological con-
text. Thus, their examination demands an adjustment of apparatus analysis. Specifi-
cally, the relationship between the material and the discursive elements of the appa-
ratus needs to be clarified based on an – inevitably rough – metatheoretical excursion. 
Foucault (1980, 119) describes the term apparatus as “a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory deci-
sions, laws, administrative measures […] – in short, the said as much as the unsaid.” 
Thus, different formations are taken into consideration that are not sufficiently de-
scribed by the term discourse.1 Some of Foucault’s statements can be interpreted in a 
way that suggests that he denies the mere existence or ascertainability of anything 
external to discourse, which is why these statements have been criticised as “antireal-
ism” or “superidealism” (Flatschart 2015, 12). However, the term apparatus can also 
be read as an attempt to consider the interplay between the discursive and the non-
discursive. Institutions, architecture, laws, etc. emerge as part of discursive social prac-
tices, but are not reducible to discourse. What the discursive as well as the non-dis-
cursive elements of the apparatus have in common is their capacity to structure ac-
tions. On the one hand, the apparatus consists of discursive practices, but on the other 
hand, it entails the essential function to produce, arrange and structure them (Agam-
ben 2009, 8). It is therefore a ‘socio-material’ infrastructure. 
In their elaborations on socio-materiality, theorists of “new materialism” or actor net-
work theory make the valid and important point that the social is always also material 
(e.g. Latour 1988). From that, however, they draw the wrong conclusion in claiming 
that the material aspects of the world are only accessible through discourse and are 
therefore produced by the symmetric “intra-action” of elements which have no distinct 
prior existence (Barad 2007). This poses two central problems. First, generally denying 
a differentiation of separate entities (not only between discourse and materiality but 
between categories in general) prevents us from identifying different degrees of cau-
sality (Sayer 2000, 34 ff). Second, it is reducing ontology to epistemology and thereby 
veiling the specifically material elements of the social which “new materialism” wanted 
to emphasise in the first place. Thus, I argue for a critical-realistic ontology that retains 
an analytic divide between discourse and materiality (later between action and struc-
ture) without renouncing their empirical entanglement in the micro apparatus (Leonardi 
2013). Flatschart (2015, 36 f) notes that: “This does not mean that discourse is not 
material or that it is material in the sense of the ‘solid materiality’ of, for example, natural 
objects espoused by vulgar materialist approaches. Materiality is a way of expressing 
the historically specific character of the relatively determinate causal efficacy of real 
(social) objects, and as such it certainly includes discursive objects.” Thus, the digital 
                                            
1 With the term discourse, I point to a critical-realistic reformulation of Foucault with Maarten 
Hajer: “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, repro-
duced and transformed to give meaning to physical and social relations” (Hajer, quoted in 
Flatschart 2015, 11). 
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micro apparatus always entails material as well as discursive elements whose relation-
ship should be thought of as a dialectic one, an interplay in which distinct elements are 
mutually generative. 
The analysis of a technological micro apparatus has to start with two superordinate 
descriptions: (A) the description of the technology in its functionality and (B) the de-
scription of its discursive context. As I will focus on conceptual issues here, methods 
of data collection and analysis will not be addressed. Neither will I describe the re-
searched self-tracking technologies in detail. However, there is an extensive literature 
on methods for the ethnographic description of technologies (e.g. Vannini 2009, Field-
ing et al. 2008), of which those working with the concept of affordances in particular 
seem to favour a materialist apparatus analysis (e.g. Volkoff and Strong 2013). Re-
garding methodologies of discourse analysis, interested readers can turn to the work 
of Norman Fairclough (2005; 2013). The data summarised here is presented else-
where in detail (Schaupp 2016a). 
I have analysed self-tracking technologies in various areas of application such as 
exercise, health/diet, time management, discipline, personal rating and overall data 
correlation. In addition, I analysed the applications concerning their functionality, as 
well as (audio-) visual and text-based advertisements. This approach offers the ad-
vantage that it grasps the specific interpellation that the corresponding technologies 
direct to their users. It can be assumed that these interpellations do not vanish without 
any effect. The exact extent to which they have an actual impact is not traceable by 
the collected data and would require semi-structured interviews with self-trackers in 
addition to the data from advertisements. However, this research is not about revealing 
the intentions of the respective actors, but about tracing the relationship between the 
technological artefacts and the political-economic macro-structures. Therefore, I sug-
gest a phenomenological approach for the first step, which could be the following: 
A) The description of the technology’s functionality should, especially if it is a digital 
technology such as the ones used for self-tracking, be subdivided into descriptions of 
the front-end visible to the users and the invisible back-end, where the machine pro-
cesses run. Goffey (2008, 16) points out how it is essential for understanding software 
to also understand its base, the underlying algorithms. These algorithms automatically 
use certain rules for concrete problems. In that way, they sort the functions of the com-
puters and thus the interactions executed on them as well. That is why the algorithm, 
in Foucauldian terminology, should not be seen as a technological discourse or as a 
statement as Goffey suggests (2008, 17 f), but as a digital micro apparatus. As such, 
its technological functionality must be described.  
Digital self-evaluation is about transforming the description of human activities to 
machine-readable information, as well as presenting them to the users. A central ques-
tion is, therefore, which reductions are undertaken? According to which rules are qual-
itative data transformed into scaled, quantitative data? How are certain entries reduced 
to prescribed categories? Another important question is: which worldviews and as-
sumptions concerning the users are inscribed into the program, and what cultural 
norms and concepts does it refer to? 
The basic function of self-tracking technologies is the feedback of processed data 
about the self to the user. Contrary to other self-measurement technologies, such as 
the body scale, self-tracking in most cases does not measure the body itself, but its 
activities. A special feature of digital feedback in self-tracking – contrary to personal 
feedback – can be found in its immediacy. When, for example, a digital worker uses 
part of her paid worktime to simply stare at the screen, it can take months until this is 
noticed by her supervisors or herself. When she shortens her running route, she might 
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never know how this plays out on her caloric intake. With the use of self-tracking tech-
nology these feedback loops are shortened. Deviation2 and feedback thus ideally hap-
pen at the same time. For the disciplining effects of this sort of feedback, the connec-
tion of sensory machines with human feedback providers is central. A flashing display 
by itself could not replace the mechanisms of social reputation under current condi-
tions. Therefore, nearly all self-tracking technologies provide the option of sharing 
one’s data with a virtual peer group. Along with this feedback loop goes the possibility 
of data correction by the user. This also explains the high degree of reliability of self-
tracking data. Thus, a system of mutual feedback between users, machines and ob-
servers is established.  
B) The second superordinate description that has to be given in order to analyse the 
technological micro apparatus concerns the discursive context in which the apparatus 
is set out. However, the term context is not to be understood as something separate 
from the apparatus itself. With Foucault, by contrast, I understand the apparatus to be 
a “system of relations” between the discursive and the non-discursive elements (Fou-
cault 1980, 194). Generally, the methodology of apparatus analysis allows for the col-
lection and analysis of all kinds of discursive data, from documents to qualitative inter-
views. In fact, it might be important to overcome the focus of discourse analysis on 
mere text-based statements. In addition to textual elements, audio-visual material is 
also relevant for the analysis of digital micro apparatuses. Just as with the analysis of 
text fragments, this is about extrapolating statements. In addition, it is important to 
consider menu navigation of the software or link structures on websites at the interface 
of material functionality and discursive context.  
The data from advertisements for self-tracking technologies analysed here indicates 
that the measured activities are mostly framed in terms of performance. On the visual 
level, the image of the mountaineer reaching a summit is used strikingly often (not only 
in sports tracking technologies). This can be interpreted as a “viseo-typical key image” 
(Ludes 2001) to display the connection between performance and success. It is im-
portant to note that the quantification of performance in self-tracking expands beyond 
its classic domains of sports and wage labour. Even in advertisements for health-track-
ing, it is regularly emphasised that the measured data is “relevant to performance” 
(Biotrakr 2015). Around the concept of performance, clusters of economic terminology 
can be found conspicuously often. “Management” becomes an overall term that can 
be used for everything including health. Trust and reputation turn into “capital”. The 
quantifying and presenting processes of self-tracking are thereby portrayed as the ba-
sis for a rational management of the self. In this respect, they can be understood as a 
sort of bookkeeping in the company of the self (Schaupp 2016b).  
When, for example, the advertisement for the running app Runtastic states that its 
aim is to “improve performance constantly” (Runtastic b [n.d.]), it quickly becomes ap-
parent that “self-knowledge through numbers”, as the slogan of the quantified-self 
movement states (Quantified Self, n.d.), is by no means an end in itself. If one follows 
the advertisement discourses, tracking should lead to an optimised self instead. This 
optimisation of the self is often framed as an increase in performance, but self-realisa-
tion also plays a central role. As is emphasised over and over again: this is not about 
making users adhere to general standards. Runtastic for example emphasises that it 
is all about “individual goals, no matter how defined” (Runtastic a [n.d.]). On the visual 
level it is striking that advertisements mainly display focused individuals. Groups are 
                                            
2 This usually does not refer to the deviation from a general standard, but to the deviation from 
an optimisation course. 
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mostly displayed abstractly or in the background. Through this emphasis on the indi-
vidual, self-tracking succeeds at enforcing neo-Tayloristic methods of rationalisation 
for all areas of living, without attacking post-Fordist individualism. In both variants of 
self-optimisation, a strong instrumental conception of the self is expressed by tech-
niques to manipulate one’s weaker self. The three most important mechanisms of self-
manipulation are the comparison to other users in rankings, different variants of gami-
fication (Whitson 2013), as well as monetary incentives working through contracts with 
oneself (Schaupp 2016a, 58 ff). With Beeminder this instrumental self-relation is ex-
pressed in the clear imperative: “Engineer yourself!” (Beeminder 2015). 
3. The Urgent Need: Controlled Flexibility 
According to Foucault (1980, 195), a “major function” of the apparatus is to respond to 
an “urgent need” at any given historical moment. The apparatus thus always presents 
an attempt to find a solution for an existing social problem insofar as the apparatus, 
according to Foucault, always entails a strategic function (Ibid.). This strategy is not to 
be understood as intentional: it has “nothing to do with any kind of strategic ruse on 
the part of some meta- or trans-historic subject conceiving and willing it.” (Ibid.). It is a 
strategy without a strategist. The apparatus cannot eliminate the “urgent need”, which 
it was made to overcome, in the sense of a mechanical repair. Instead, the apparatus, 
through its overdetermining way of functioning, opens up new “urgent needs” for every 
old one it overcomes. The apparatus reacts to an “urgent need” and seeks to overcome 
it. As a result, it creates effects which counteract this attempt and create additional 
“urgent needs”. For a materialist apparatus analysis, the “urgent need” serves as the 
hinge between micro and macro apparatus. By identifying the superordinate “urgent 
needs” to which an apparatus reacts, we come closer to an explanation of its social 
function.  
The identification of an “urgent need” needs to proceed empirically as well as theo-
retically. It is easy, in most cases, to empirically identify concrete problems that a given 
technology is supposed to fix. This can be done by semi-structured interviews with 
developers, but also by analysing advertisements, as I did in the study summarized 
here. However, a materialist apparatus analysis must emphasise the politico-economic 
context of the “urgent need”. Therefore, identifying the urgent need cannot be done by 
empirical research alone, but requires a theoretical framework. To illustrate this, I will 
elaborate in the following section how self-tracking can be understood as a reaction to 
an “urgent need” for control in post-Fordism. This is not to argue, however, that the 
examined micro apparatus is the only social reaction to the respective “urgent need” 
or vice versa. Instead, it must be understood as part of a complex network of relations.3 
In the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate the methodological function of the “ur-
gent need” concept by first giving short examples of how an urgent need can be iden-
tified a) empirically and b) theoretically, and then sketching out how self-tracking reacts 
to this “urgent need”. 
Self-tracking still partially consists of classic workplace surveillance. Thus, many 
applications offer so-called ‘team versions’ of their programs which can be used by 
companies to control their employees. RescueTime for example offers a time manage-
ment tool that can be installed on computers to track every keystroke and make regular 
                                            
3 Obviously, the relation of self-tracking practices to societal power structures is not limited to 
the economic level. Particularly relevant are connections to gender relations or to societal 
body norms about which the self-tracking discourse adds informative findings (Lupton 2015b; 
Schaupp 2016b). 
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screenshots of the employees’ displays. The company consequently describes its pro-
gram as a “business intelligence tool” (RescueTime a [n.d.]). This points to a persistent 
“urgent need” for control, which is inherent to capitalist wage labour itself because it 
deals with the problem of the transformation of bought labour-power into real labour. 
However, self-tracking technologies are suitable, above all, to control independent, 
creative, or self-employed work. Thus, another RescueTime slogan runs: “As an en-
trepreneur you need to work efficiently. RescueTime monitors what you do and where 
you are wasting time” (RescueTime b [n.d.]). Here, the individual is addressed as an 
entrepreneur, who has the same relationship to him- or herself as a manager has to 
his or her employees. Thus, the entrepreneurial self has a new “urgent need” for con-
trol. 
However, this kind of self-control is not limited to work, but can be applied to opti-
mising every aspect of life. The optimisation of health seems to be particularly inter-
esting in economic terms. Thus, one self-tracking company claims: “each 1% reduction 
in the number of overweight employees saved the company approximately $1.7 million 
annually” (StickK, n.d.). The rationalisation of the production of health obviously also 
concerns states and health insurance. Several health insurance providers have started 
to substantially build their bonus programs on self-tracking data, and doctors have 
started to prescribe self-tracking apps to their patients (Lupton 2015a, IX ff.). The Eu-
ropean Commission also assumes that self-tracking technologies contribute to “a more 
patient-focused healthcare, and supporting the shift towards prevention while at the 
same time improving the efficiency of the system.” (European Commission 2014, 4). 
Thereby, they expect cost savings of several hundred billion Euro in the health care 
budget of EU member states. 
The “urgent need” that is constituted here presents itself primarily as a need for 
quantitative data as a basis for an entrepreneurial approach to the self. This problem 
is also explicitly posed in many self-tracking advertisements. Biotrakr for example ad-
vertises with the slogan “you can only manage what you can measure” (2015). This 
exposes how the need for self-management is systematically connected to the need 
for data. Thus, we can find empirical traces of an “urgent need” for a new form of 
control. 
To sharpen the identification of the “urgent need”, Marx’s concepts of exploitation 
and alienation can serve as a theoretical starting point. In the economic-philosophical 
manuscripts, Marx describes the connection between exploitation and alienation as 
follows:  
 
“The more the worker spends himself, the more powerful 
becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over 
and against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner world 
– becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. […] The 
worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer 
belongs to him but to the object. […] The alienation of the 
worker in his product means not only that his labor be-
comes an object, an external existence, but that it exists 
outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and 
that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It 
means that the life which he has conferred on the object 
confronts him as something hostile and alien.” (1959, 22) 
This relationship between exploitation and alienation, or rather of production and con-
trol, has a particularly trenchant manifestation in self-tracking. If the “object” or the 
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product of work consists of intimate expressions of life, as is often the case with crea-
tive or emotional work, the alienation from life takes on a new quality. The work itself 
requires a cybernetic form of control, such as in self-tracking. This control itself then 
becomes a sort of work in the Marxian sense, when it produces goods in the form of 
data. These then become the basis of a second-order control in the moment they are 
used in advertising or in health educational interventions to manipulate the behaviour 
of actors. The more the self-tracker “puts his life into the object” when producing data, 
the more information he or she creates, the more “the life which he has conferred on 
the object confronts him as something hostile and alien.” (Ibid.). 
In self-tracking, self-control and classical surveillance seem to merge: in the ‘front 
end’, i.e. the interface of an application or website visible to users, information is pre-
sented. In the back end, digital activities of users are recorded and a variety of data 
are collected, such as location or the technical features of the device. These are then 
turned into commodities in the form of aggregated data packages or personalised pro-
files. Self-tracking data thus appears in a double form: first, the data that is visible to 
the users and presented according to their wishes, and second, in the form of a com-
modity, with different content serving a completely different purpose. In terms of the 
data commodity, it is not just information on how efficiently the user of RescueTime 
works which is sold, but information on the topics that the user clicks on or the products 
the user buys. In digital self-evaluation, these general characteristics of the Internet 
economy go along with other important qualities that make collected self-measurement 
data especially valuable. On the one hand, the data is the outcome of comprehensive 
self-surveillance and thus its significance is much higher than the usual user-tracking 
or social media profiles. The second feature follows on from the users themselves hav-
ing an interest in correct data, which leads to them adjusting measurement errors.  
This also allows for important conclusions about processes of subjectification which 
take place in digital self-evaluation. As many studies have shown, with the rise of a 
post-Fordist economy, the requirements towards workers have changed in a way that 
can be summarised as the inclusion of the whole subjectivity into the economic pro-
cess. Capital uses the workforce ever less in the sense of technical competencies. 
Instead, it demands the integration of the whole person with its manual as well as its 
cognitive and emotional capabilities (Hirsch 2005, 137). With the term of the entrepre-
neurial self, Bröckling (2015), following on from Foucault, has shown that in post-Ford-
ism work is often not limited to fixed working hours, but entails for example the optimi-
sation of appearance, health, education or creativity in the sense of human capital. It 
is important to note that this work on the self is a fundamental part of the production of 
value in post-Fordism and must be understood as work in the process of the accumu-
lation of capital. Foucault describes how individuals are using certain techniques of the 
self4 to be able to conform to certain social requirements. The embodied self is there-
fore always created in an altercation with social power structures. The subjectification 
of work described above is accompanied by new requirements imposed on the workers 
that could, according to Traue (2010, 273), be described as a “post-bureaucratic profile 
of requirements”. Thus, we can theoretically identify a societal “urgent need” for tech-
nologies of (self-)control, which foster a Tayloristic rationalisation of work, as well as 
self-realisation for the entrepreneurial self. 
                                            
4 With the term techniques of the self, Michel Foucault (1986) points to forms of self-reference 
that enable the subjects to transform and rule themselves. He analyses these techniques 
inter alia with examples of confession and the antique dietetics.  
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To answer the question of which way self-tracking reacts to the identified “urgent need” 
for control, it seems to be useful to turn to the concept of cybernetics. Traue (2010) 
argues that to be able to fulfil the requirements outlined above, individuals use so called 
“cybernetic techniques of the self”. These allow for a flexible self-optimisation based 
on feedback loops. Many social media technologies are based on this kind of cyber-
netic model, in which the subject is understood to be an information processing system 
that adapts to the norms of its environment as flexibly as possible, even if it is only 
constantly ‘informed’ through feedback. In this sense, digital self-evaluation in general 
and the practices of self-tracking specifically can be understood as cybernetic tech-
niques of the self par excellence (Schaupp 2016c).  
Digital evaluation of the self thus reacts to the identified “urgent need” for control in 
a way that the self-tracking application Beeminder (2017) calls “flexible self-control”. 
To understand the principles of this sort of (self-)control, recourse to cybernetics is 
helpful. A central problem of this universal science of “communication and control” 
(Wiener 1948) was the enabling of an automatic self-regulation of complex systems. 
For this purpose, the cyberneticians conceptualised the homeostat, an abstract ma-
chine that is the central model of the cybernetic theory of self-regulation. The homeo-
stat consists of a sensor, a data processing module, and an output module. It was 
applied to several kinds of problems from the automatic regulation of temperature up 
to the complete automation of factories (including the management) (see, for example, 
Beer 1959). The technologies of self-evaluation can thus be understood as a homeo-
stat for subjects imagined as complex systems. They rely entirely on supporting the 
self-optimisation of the corresponding system by providing relevant feedback, based 
on self-surveillance.  
Jürgen Link (2006, 54) also describes the apparatuses of normalisation of modern 
society as homeostats. However, on the social level he associates the homeostat ex-
clusively with “proto-normalism”, which he contrasts with “flexibility-normalism” which 
is characteristic for the post-Fordist economy. In the latter, “the homeostatic model at 
large is principally seen as only a subordinate, technical instrument, to keep the dom-
inant dynamic from cracking up, exploding or collapsing.” (Ibid., 55). This association 
of cybernetics with halt, contrasted with dynamism as its opposite, is, however, inac-
curate. Dynamism is a cornerstone of cybernetics, and in particular, management cy-
berneticians such as Stafford Beer stress that cybernetic regulation in a capitalist econ-
omy cannot be anything else than the promotion of constant growth: “the ultimately 
stable state to which a viable system may run (that state where its entropy is unity) is 
finally rigid and we call that death. If the system is to remain viable, if it is not to die, 
then we need the extra concept of an equilibrium that is not fixed, but on the move” 
(Beer 2002/1973, 5). These drastic words that equate halt to death make clear how 
homeostasis cannot be thought of as a state of static equilibrium, but as a continuous 
adaption of the system to dynamic conditions in the environment. Growth itself is thus 
the equilibrium that is aimed for.  
In this sense, the answer that self-tracking presents to the “urgent need” for control 
outlined above is, in cybernetic terms, a homeostatic feedback module for any problem 
of optimisation in complex systems. It adheres closely to the central principles of cy-
bernetics, which are self-measurement, feedback and self-optimisation. However, self-
tracking is not about reaching a certain level constituted as normal in order to dispense 
pressure, as in Link’s concept of normalism (2006, 453). Instead, its model of homeo-
stasis is about complying with a certain framework of tolerance on a journey to a prin-
cipally interminable self-optimisation (Bröckling 2006).  
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4. The Macro Apparatus: A Cybernetic Regime? 
Materialist apparatus analysis focuses particularly on detecting politico-economic 
power relations, which are expressed in the micro apparatuses examined. The ap-
proach, outlined in the three steps above (micro apparatus, “urgent need”, macro ap-
paratus), is meant to ensure that power relations are identified systematically, instead 
of framing the research with these assumptions right from the start, especially as this 
bias is something the Foucauldian apparatus analysis can be accused of. This analysis 
needs to include the following questions: which ways of acting does the apparatus 
enable or restrict, materially as well as discursively? Which forms of subjectification 
are demanded by the interpellations of the apparatus? And which superordinate social 
structures are stabilised or transformed? 
Contrary to the situational style of research suggested for apparatus analysis by 
Lepa et al. (2014), here, the chosen access is a materialist one. Situational analysis 
partially follows Latour in making us believe that power effects result spontaneously 
from immediate “networks of associations” (Latour 1986) of human and non-human 
actors. However, this is not true for apparatuses as I understand them. In their material 
condition and institutional context, apparatuses always reach beyond immediate “situ-
ations” – they belong to the realm of structures. This is especially problematic when 
analysing politico-economic power relations. In our case, for example, digital self-eval-
uation is related to the contemporary dynamics of capitalism. However, the two are not 
just a flat network of association: capitalism preceded digital self-evaluation. Without 
claiming that capitalism is the causal reason for self-tracking, it can be said that cau-
sality is in no way symmetrical here because capitalism and digital self-evaluation are 
on different ontological levels. The Latourian flat ontology cannot grasp this problem 
and is therefore incapable of recognising politico-economic power relations. This is 
also illustrated by Latour’s theoretical development of first denying the relevance of 
power (1986), then that of capitalism (1988, 173) and finally equalling social critique in 
general to conspiracy theory (2004). As materialist apparatus analysis is specifically 
about politico-economic power relations, it needs to turn to another meta-theory.  
Therefore, I suggest staying with the analytic divide between materiality and dis-
course as well as structure and action. On this basis, I suggest a methodology that 
fulfils its critical claim specifically by focusing on power structures, which by definition 
go beyond singular situations. In this sense, Flatschart (2015, 10) outlines a critical-
realist discourse analysis that takes into account the “historical totality” which he calls 
the “capitalistic-patriarchal society”. I follow his approach, but prefer the term macro 
apparatus or regime as the superordinate structure. The term “capitalist totality” entails 
two problems. On the one hand, it ignores the theoretical possibility and empirical re-
ality of social relations in which capitalism is not the (central) structuring principle. On 
the other hand, it runs into danger by falling for an economic determinism in which the 
possibility for resistance and the substantial openness of social structures is ignored. 
Instead, the term macro apparatus names a social formation that clearly stands out 
over singular situations, but does not make a claim for universality. A macro apparatus 
can rightfully be called so if, in a certain historical situation, a variety of micro apparat-
uses can be shown that do follow its logic and take part in its reproduction. This does 
not exclude the simultaneous existence of other macro apparatuses. The macro appa-
ratus illustrated here can be called a cybernetic regime. In the following paragraph, I 
will elaborate on this term in respect of digital self-evaluation.  
As stated above, digital self-evaluation follows the principles of feedback-based cy-
bernetic control. Several other studies have located the revitalisation of these princi-
ples of control in other areas as well. Elsewhere, I have pointed to the revitalisation of 
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these principles in, for example, police work (Schaupp 2016a, 103 ff). Raffetseder et 
al. (2017) elaborate on the comprehensive cybernetisation of organisational control 
that goes along with the trend of digitization. Traue (2010) shows that cybernetic con-
trol does not depend on digital technologies, but is also manifested in psycho-technol-
ogies such as systemic consultation. Power’s (1997) diagnosis of the omnipresence of 
different mechanisms of evaluation in the “audit society” can be interpreted as an early 
form of the macro apparatus of cybernetisation described above. Currently, the dis-
course around the industrial Internet of Things (IoT) shows that the revitalisation of 
cybernetic control mechanisms is by no means limited to digital self-evaluation, but 
incorporates a broader politico-economic development. The central demands of the 
IoT discourse clearly follow a cybernetic logic. First, mechanisms for data collection 
and processing need to be established in order to optimise all the activities within the 
organisation permanently via immediate feedback. Second, the companies framed as 
systems will adapt more flexibly to changing conditions in the environment and selec-
tively open up to surroundings. Third, the model of production shifts from mass pro-
duction planned in the long-term to a black-boxed model of immediate coupling of pro-
duction and consumption, aiming at the industrial production of batch size 15 (Raffet-
seder 2017). Digital self-evaluation can thus be subsumed under the broader phenom-
enon of cybernetisation.  
Feedback-based control via digital technologies is entangled with the accumulation 
of capital on different levels. Marx (1977, 231) mainly describes the accumulation of 
capital as the appropriation of labour by capital. This still applies to capital accumula-
tion in post-Fordism. However, the appropriation and commodification of information 
adds another level to this process. If, for example, work is controlled via self-tracking, 
the collected data becomes the property of the corresponding company. Thus, the ap-
propriation of work is doubled. Apart from control of the labour itself, control also be-
comes an immediate part of capital accumulation, not only through the rationalisation 
of production, but in the sense that control itself creates commodities in the form of 
information. Data collection and processing are melting into the same process with the 
production of goods and with control over the production process. Most of the time it is 
even enabled by the same technical infrastructure. This merger does not only appear 
in self-tracking but rather is a characteristic of the high-tech capitalism of the early 21st 
century. It manifests itself within a cybernetic regime of production and control. 
Digital technologies play an important role in this macro apparatus. However, it must 
be understood as a heterogeneous ensemble of technological, cultural and economic 
shifts, for which I suggest the term cybernetic regime. The central characteristic of this 
regime is the merging of information processing, production of goods, and control, un-
der which digital self-evaluation can be subsumed as well. However, there is still the 
need for more empirical research into the possibility of deviant uses of cybernetic in-
frastructure, in order not to overlook transformative potentials. Generally, materialist 
apparatus analysis should not be misunderstood as a functionalist argument for the 
determination of the micro-level by macro-structures. One must be careful therefore, 
not to simply replace empirical research with theoretical reflection.  
5. Conclusion: Evaluation of the Evaluation of Self-Evaluation 
The sketch worked out in this paper presents the essential features of a critical analytic 
frame for digital self-evaluation. In the focus of the proposal lies the question of which 
power structures are expressed in the examined technologies. Therefore, contrary to 
                                            
5 Hence, single made products. This tendency is also called mass customization. 
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the paradigm of flat ontology and the deconstruction of levels currently dominating sci-
ence and technology studies, it is necessary to distinguish analytically discourse from 
materiality, and action from structure. A dialectical materialist understanding of the 
term apparatus allows us to recognise the discursive and material aspects of the ap-
paratus as mutually constituting. It also allows us to combine the analysis of concrete 
technological constellations with a critical-theoretical reflection. This ensures that 
power structures hidden from immediate empirical access are neither overlooked nor 
implied in the basic assumptions but identified analytically. 
One question must remain at the centre of a materialist apparatus analysis. How is 
it possible to take seriously the discursive as well as the materialistic aspects of digital 
technologies? The material cannot thereby be reduced to the discursive level or vice 
versa. The central aim is to look at the materiality of digital technologies in a way that 
puts social power relations into focus.  
Following Deleuze, I undertook a separation of micro and macro apparatus. This 
allows me to put self-evaluation into a politico-economic context. The methodological 
aim is to build a bridge between the empirical analysis and the socio-theoretical reflec-
tion of the analysed technologies. The Foucauldian term “urgent need” functions as a 
connection between the two levels of analysis, namely micro and macro apparatus, as 
different micro apparatuses react to it. In this sense, self-tracking can be interpreted 
as a form of rationalisation of the work on the self, rather than a narcissistic obsession: 
Each missed run, each excess calorie, each minute dreamt away at work will be meas-
ured and logged. The runner, eater, or dreamer will be reminded of it, not to forget to 
make the very best of him- or herself. However, achievements will not be overlooked 
anymore either. Each high performance brings an advancement in the ranking of self-
tracking websites. This perspective enables connections to a concept of the subject in 
which not only workers and capitalists, but also suspect and police officer are melting 
into one person.  
Digital self-evaluation can also be identified as an expression of a macro apparatus 
of cybernetisation. However, pointing to the omnipresence of evaluation (Power 1997) 
is not a sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. Instead, its causes can be found, 
among others, in the reconciliation of the opposite neoliberal demands for flexibility 
and rationalisation. This primarily happens in the merging of information processing, 
production of goods and control. To stress these politico-economic factors, the macro 
apparatus can tentatively be called a cybernetic regime. This consists in establishing 
self-optimising systems which manipulate actors to behave efficiently. As it is charac-
terised by a multiplicity of apparatuses of control with subjectifying effects, which in 
turn remain uncontrolled by the subjects themselves, a state of alienation can be as-
sumed under the cybernetic regime. However, in the context of apparatus analysis, 
alienation does not mean a deviation from a non-alienated original condition as Marx’s 
anthropological conception of the subject might indicate (cf. Flügel-Martinsen 2010). 
Instead, when asking about the subjectifying effects of the apparatus, the subject must 
always be understood as having been produced already. Someone is alienated, then, 
as Jaeggi (2014, 219) explains, “if she cannot react to her own given conditions”. In 
our context, the term alienation also seems to be useful for showing how the identified 
macro apparatus reflects on the subjects.  
Thus, the cybernetic regime is manifested in a variety of micro apparatuses of feed-
back that ask for a total evaluation. Our expressions of life have to be evaluated digi-
tally. This evaluation must be evaluated by the social sciences. Finally, the evaluation 
of the evaluation must be evaluated critically. The lucky ones can sell their evaluations. 
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Whoever does not choose to evaluate has to become the “idiot” (Dany 2014), fooling 
all feedback loops.
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